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Who Wins In 
November? 


The il Inside Politics 99 that will Decide the 
Presidency in 1916 


BY 

DONALD R. RICHBERG 

OF THE CHICAGO BAR; FORMER DIRECTOR 
PROGRESSIVE NATIONAL LEGISLATIVE REFERENCE BUREAU 


CHICAGO 

FREDERICK J. DRAKE & CO. 


Copyright 1916 

By Frederick J. Drake & Co. 



SEP 15 1916 


©CI.A438414 


CONTENTS 


PAGE 

The Actual Battleground. 7 

Mexico . 12 

Preparedness. 27 

Americanism. 30 

The Tariff. 37 

Woman Suffrage. 42 

Labor . 45 

Efficiency .. 53 

Progressivism . 57 

The Party Choice. 71 

“Minor” Issues . 83 

Who Wins . 87 






















Who Wins in November? 


THE ACTUAL BATTLEGROUND 

OF 1916. 

Should the independent, progressive 
citizen vote for Wilson or for Hughes? 
That is the big question in the presiden¬ 
tial campaign of 1916. 

A conservative partisan republican 
should have no doubts. He will vote for 
Hughes. The platform of 1916 presents 
nothing that is radical. The candidate 
had an early conservative training as a 
high grade lawyer — and has given his 
greatest public service in the Supreme 
Court of the United States. His mind is 
open to progressive thinking, but he will 
never lead his party away from “safe and 
sane” doctrine. 


7 



8 


WHO WINS IN NOVEMBER? 


The conservative partisan democrat 
should have few doubts. He will vote for 
Wilson. The President may be pretty 
radical in policy and the platform is fairly 
progressive, but his southern-controlled 
party will not be driven into any marked 
radicalism in legislation or administra¬ 
tion. Furthermore the party is in power, 
and self-interest will hold its conservative 
vote in line to continue that power. 

The progressive democrat will vote for 
Wilson because he is convinced of Wil¬ 
son’s progressivism and will wish to ap¬ 
prove and continue his administration. 

The marking of the ballot on Novem¬ 
ber 7, 1916, is already settled for the 
major number of these groups. 

There remain the progressive former- 
republicans and the independents, per¬ 
haps three to four million men and wom¬ 
en, enough to determine the election. 
Each party realizes that a majority of 
these must be won over to its side to bring 
victory. Each party is seeking to cap- 


BATTLEGROUND OF 1916 


ture these progressive-independents and 
so the issues they are expected to decide 
are clouded in the dust of the battle 
fought around them. Both parties de¬ 
clare for equal suffrage and then the 
republican candidate plays a trump card 
by announcing himself in favor of a 
constitutional amendment. Both parties 
declare for the protection of children and 
then the democratic president plays a 
trump card by forcing congress to pass 
an anti-child-labor law. In the Mexican 
muddle the republican candidate declares 
vigorously for the protection of American 
lives and property. The democratic can¬ 
didate replies that he will not shed Amer¬ 
ican blood merely to protect the capital 
of those investors who voluntarily choose 
the risks of exploiting the resources of a 
foreign country. 

Where is the progressive, independent 
citizen to obtain condensed information, 
free from party bias and the prejudice of 
self-interest, on which to make up his own 


10 


WHO WINS IN NOVEMBER? 


mind as to what the real issues are and 
whom he would put in power to act for 
him in solving these national problems? 
Campaign literature, newspaper and 
magazine stories, inevitably shaped to 
accord with editorial policy, are inefficient 
guides. It requires much more time and 
thought than the average man or woman 
will give from daily work and amusement, 
to arrive at safe judgment through these 
sources of information. 

It is the purpose of this writing to pre¬ 
sent in brief form the real issues between 
candidates and parties as shown by docu¬ 
ments and performances, supplemented 
by the writer’s intimate knowledge of 
much of the “inside politics” and “invisi¬ 
ble government” of recent years. This 
book is not written as a brief for either 
party. There is no effort to argue the 
case, but simply to present the evidence 
on both sides. Here are a few vital facts 
from which opposite conclusions may be 
reached by men of opposing tempera- 


BATTLEGROUND OF 1916 


11 


merits, but whereby each reader may de¬ 
termine for himself how he can use his 
vote to express his desires and his inter¬ 
ests in the public service and to put in 
office those who will most nearly represent 
him. 


MEXICO 


It is the evident republican intention 
to make Mexico one of the main issues of 
the campaign. The conflict here is be¬ 
tween the candidates. Will you choose 
Wilson or Hughes to act for you? Party 
platforms and party orators shoot blank 
cartridges in foreign affairs. The Presi¬ 
dent controls and directs foreign policy 
with power limited very little except by 
public opinion—which he can usually in¬ 
cline to his judgment. 

Wilson’s actions in Mexico, inconsist¬ 
ent and unsatisfactory in many ways, 
have been based on certain fixed ideas. 
Hughes’ criticism is founded on opposing 
ideas and there is a fairly clear choice 
offered to the voter between the two men. 
Let us consider first the Wilson policy 
and then the Hughes alternative. 

12 


MEXICO 


13 


A LEGACY FROM TAFT 

The Mexican problem was bequeathed 
to Wilson by Taft. Madero had been 
President of Mexico, the victor in a war 
for the poor against the strong-arm rule 
of Diaz for the benefit of the rich. Madero 
was an idealist, in many ways impractical, 
putting too much faith in the ability of a 
down-trodden, uneducated people to un¬ 
derstand their own interests and support 
their friends. His General Huerta was 
treacherous, cruel and greedy. Madero 
was imprisoned, tortured to force him to 
abdicate, and finally murdered. Huerta 
seized the government, and, backed by the 
largest number of soldiers and with great 
financial power ready to aid him, sought 
recognition from the United States. 

Recognition of Huerta could have been 
based on the demand, voiced by Hughes 
in this campaign, that he should guaran¬ 
tee protection of American lives and prop- 


11 


WHO WINS IN NOVEMBER? 


erty. He was the strong man in Mexico 
and with recognition probably could have 
made good this guarantee. But the Amer¬ 
ican people at that time on a popular vote 
would have rejected overwhelmingly the 
proposal to recognize the “red-handed 
traitor”. The President undoubtedly ex¬ 
pressed the outraged moral sentiments of 
the country in refusing recognition. 

The Mexican government promptly be¬ 
came a chaos of fighting interests. War¬ 
ring leaders ruled shifting sections of the 
country—Huerta, Villa, Carranza, Za¬ 
pata and lesser men, varying from half- 
civilized national politicians to savage 
local bandits. 

TWO POSSIBLE POLICIES 

American influence could be exerted in 
only two ways: First, armed intervention; 
second, support of the most capable Mex¬ 
ican leader who could be supported with 
self-respect. 


MEXICO 


15 


INTERVENTION ? 

Intervention meant the raising of an 
army of 500,000 men (by conscription, 
for it is plain there would have been few 
volunteers) and embarking on a conquest 
which would cost thousands of lives, mil¬ 
lions of dollars and imperiled our cordial 
relations with all South and Central 
America. It meant that we would have 
the Mexican problem on our hands for a 
generation or more. How should the 
United States recover its losses? Should 
we be compensated by money, by an¬ 
nexed territory or merely by our con¬ 
sciousness of duty well done? After the 
great cost of money and blood spent to in¬ 
tervene, would not the nation demand 
annexation? With our problem of the 
Indians solved only by their extermina¬ 
tion and our problem of the great colored 
population of the South yet unsolved, 
were we to add the problem of making 



16 


WHO WINS IN NOVEMBER? 


citizens or subjects out of several million 
enslaved and hopelessly ignorant peons? 

WE MUDDLE ALONG 

The President rejected the solution of 
intervention and here again he undoubt¬ 
edly represented the wishes of the Amer¬ 
ican people. By special agents, through 
all manner of sources, the President 
sought to learn who the strong man of 
Mexico might be whom we could support. 
Meanwhile we “muddled along”. Amer¬ 
ican citizens were killed in Mexico, Amer¬ 
ican women were barbarously maltreated, 
American property was destroyed, and 
yet our Government took no decisive 
steps. 

Of many of our acts and our failures to 
act we cannot but feel heartily ashamed. 
The Tampico incident was one of the worst, 
where American warships in the harbor 
were withdrawn on direct orders from 
Washington while our citizens, threatened 
with death and things worse than death 


MEXICO 


17 


by the Mexican mob, were rescued by 
British and German ships. Our loss of 
self-respect and national pride—our loss 
in the respect of other nations—from such 
events is great and lasting. It is the tra¬ 
ditional first duty of every nation to pro¬ 
tect its citizens in foreign lands and even 
the weaker nations form alliances with 
greater powers in order to fulfill this duty. 
We can not relax our national pride and 
courage to protect our citizens abroad 
without sacrificing not only each man’s 
pride in his citizenship and his personal 
safety outside his own country but also 
his ability to meet equally other nationali¬ 
ties in the markets of the world. We lose 
honor and prosperity in the same disgrace. 

Wilson’s defense 

There is a powerful defense for the 
Wilson policy, however, despite the ad¬ 
mitted shame of the record at Tampico, 
the humiliation of taking and then aban¬ 
doning Vera Cruz, and the Carrizal mas- 




18 WHO WINS IN NOVEMBER? 

sacre. Americans were warned to leave 
Mexico. It was a country almost in an¬ 
archy where we could only protect them 
at a disproportionate cost of lives and 
money to our people. Plainly we would 
not be expected to subjugate Central 
Africa because some savage tribe killed 
American hunters or missionaries. The 
question is, where to draw the line, be¬ 
tween a country where the citizen abroad 
takes his own risk and one where his gov¬ 
ernment protects him. Our government 
ordinarily protects its people, by calling 
on the responsible foreign government to 
protect them, and if there is no respon¬ 
sible government, it may be thought the 
duty of Americans to flee the foreign 
country and not ask us to pacify it to 
protect them. 

Furthermore many of the large Amer¬ 
ican interests in Mexico had done their 
full share in the exploitation of the coun¬ 
try at the expense of the inhabitants, and 
much of the clamor for our government to 


MEXICO 


19 


insure safety in Mexico came from those 
who were not wholly irresponsible for the 
unhappy condition there and whose noisy 
demands to protect lives covered a more 
anxious desire for the protection of highly 
profitable investments. 

A SIDE-LIGHT 

There is another side-light cast upon 
the President’s policy which has received 
little or no publicity. During the first 
year or so of the present administration 
Wilson was endeavoring against great 
opposition to force certain constructive 
measures through Congress which he re¬ 
garded as of vast importance in our 
domestic affairs—notably the currency 
bill creating the Federal Reserve Board. 
It required all the presidential pressure, 
aided by alert public interest, to carry this 
program through. Whether rightly or 
wrongly convinced, it is stated on the best 
authority, that the President was con¬ 
vinced that much of the Mexican agitation 


20 


WHO WINS IN NOVEMBER? 


in this country had as a strong incentive 
the desire to block his domestic program. 
Financiers opposing the currency bill had 
a common cause, if not a common money 
interest, with financiers involved in Mex¬ 
ico. Of course if the country were excited 
to demand Mexican intervention and Con¬ 
gress thrown into a whirlpool of war meas¬ 
ures, there would be a speedy end to all 
domestic law-making. If we had adopted 
a vigorous, aggressive policy toward Mex¬ 
ico in 1913 it may be seriously doubted 
whether the new laws, which form the 
record on which Wilson seeks re-election, 
would ever have been adopted. 

THE QUESTION FOR HUGHES 

The final excuse for all that is unhappy 
and truly shameful in the Mexican mud¬ 
dle is found in the question that Hughes 
must answer to defeat Wilson on this 
issue: “What better could you have 
done?” The American people didn’t want 
Huerta recognized, so we didn’t do it— 


MEXICO 


21 


and there was chaos. We had no army 
adequate to police Mexico and the people 
didn’t want us to draft an army—because 
they didn’t want to intervene. No decent 
leader in Mexico became big enough to 
be recognized—until Carranza crawled up 
on top—and, though he is far from strong, 
he is the best we have found, so we have 
tried to get along with him. 

There is the situation: We haven’t 
played a very fine part in this Mexican 
business. In fact, for a big country we 
have looked pretty small. If Hughes can 
show a good policy he is entitled to ap¬ 
proval over Wilson on this issue because 
on results the Wilson policy has not been 
very good — except that, up to date, he 
has “kept us out of war”; that is, Amer¬ 
ican citizens and soldiers have been robbed 
and slain, but we haven’t raised an army 
and invaded Mexico. What would 
Hughes have done? 


22 


WHO WINS IN NOVEMBER? 


HUGHES* POSITION 

The Hughes’ position appears about as 
follows: 

First—The President should have 
adopted a definite policy and carried it 
out—in order to preserve our respect as a 
nation and to insure some kind of order 
continuously in Mexico. Instead we 
watched and waited and vacillated from 
action to non-action, so that we lost the 
respect of other nations and insured the 
continuation of disorder in Mexico. 

Second—As an example of the harm 
of a changing policy, note the embargo on 
arms. If we had adopted a policy of help¬ 
ing the existing government we should 
have let arms through to that government. 
If we had adopted a policy which might 
eventually require us to intervene, we 
should have prevented our prospective 
enemies from getting arms with which to 
fight us. Instead, we ruined the existing 


MEXICO 


23 


government by stopping arms (among 
other methods), and then we let arms 
through to men who are now fighting us. 

Third—Even if we refused to recognize 
Huerta on moral grounds, we should have 
kept hands off so that if he were able he 
could have eventually pacified Mexico 
completely. (Apparently this position 
looked toward Huerta’s eventual recogni¬ 
tion—when he had “justified” his crimes 
by entire success and the edge of our moral 
rage had been blunted by time. This 
alternative seems to mean that we should 
never have officially recognized the Mex¬ 
ican government until Huerta’s death or 
overthrow, but meanwhile there would 
have been a tyrannical peace in the house 
of our neighbor. If Huerta’s disease, 
from which he recently died, could have 
been diagnosed accurately in 1913, this 
policy of “watchful waiting” might have 
been regarded as most scientific state¬ 
craft.) 


24 WHO WINS IN NOVEMBER? 

RECOGNIZE HUERTA 

Fourth—The eventful Hughes position 
as it is being developed appears most cer¬ 
tain in its results and to present the 
squarest alternative to the Wilson policy. 
In his Chicago speech—August 8 — he 
said that the administration should have 
said to Huerta: “We will recognize you 
if you can perform your international 
obligations, if you have got a real govern¬ 
ment that can discharge its duties — we 
won’t recognize unless we are satisfied 
that you have”. In the same speech 
Hughes denounced the destruction of the 
only government that Mexico had because 
we did not like the moral character of 
Huerta — and condemned also “meddle¬ 
some interference with what does not con¬ 
cern us.” 

A CLEAR ISSUE 


Here is a clear issue between Wilson 
and Hughes. Back of the Hughes policy 
is the time-honored theory of statecraft in 


MEXICO 


25 


foreign affairs: All we demand of an¬ 
other country is that the responsible gov¬ 
ernment protect American lives and prop¬ 
erty within its borders and live up to its 
international obligations to us. We are 
not concerned with the manner in which 
control of government is obtained or exer¬ 
cised in that country so long as our inter¬ 
ests are protected. We are not concerned 
with the character of the government or 
its rulers, nor with the welfare of other 
peoples under other governments. Our 
obligation in foreign affairs is the protec¬ 
tion of Americans and their interests and 
that alone. 

Back of the Wilson policy is the newer 
(but not necessarily therefore better or 
even practical) theory that we have 
spiritual obligations as a nation whereby 
we can not give aid and comfort and have 
friendly intercourse with governments or 
rulers that offend our moral sense—that 
we must exercise in international affairs a 
moral, as well as a self-protective force. 


26 WHO WINS IN NOVEMBER? 

It may be well to consider that the inter¬ 
national reformer, like the local reformer, 
is likely to be met with the suggestion that 
his own house must be in perfect order be¬ 
fore he passes judgment on his neighbor’s 
housekeeping. And yet more practically 
it should be considered that the active 
exercise of moral force in international af¬ 
fairs requires a backing of physical force 
or else the consequences may be embar¬ 
rassing and even disastrous. To succeed 
with a policy of aggressive morality will 
require a supporting policy of equally ag¬ 
gressive military and naval preparedness. 

But these suggestions only affect the 
practical carrying out of the policy chosen. 
The issue in this campaign between the 
Wilson foreign policy and the Hughes for¬ 
eign policy is made plain by their attitudes 
toward Mexico. Let the voter understand 
the essential differences in the two points 
of views and then decide which he desires 
to be the policy of America in foreign 
affairs. That is the big Mexican issue. 


PREPAREDNESS 


The issue of preparedness was raised by 
Colonel Roosevelt with such effect that, 
prior to the conventions, President Wilson 
made a short speaking campaign through 
the middle west advocating a limited but 
substantial increase in our military and 
naval force. Between his position and the 
Roosevelt demand for universal service it 
appeared that a question of vast import¬ 
ance might be decided in this campaign. 
Then the democratic congress adopted a 
program so utterly inadequate to meet the 
demands of the Secretary of War that, 
when the President receded from his ad¬ 
vanced position and failed to support his 
cabinet officer, the Secretary of War re¬ 
signed. 

DIFFERENCES NOT FUNDAMENTAL 

A great opportunity to make this one of 
the fundamental and genuine issues of the 

n 


28 


WHO WINS IN NOVEMBER? 


campaign was presented. But the repub¬ 
lican platform and the republican candi¬ 
date have rejected the opportunity. The 
issue as made is rather one of method than 
of program. The democrats are criticized 
for their changes in policy and for their 
ineffectiveness in increasing our defensive 
forces. But the program of prepared¬ 
ness as announced by Hughes is uncer¬ 
tain in terms and indefinite in amount. 
Hughes in his acceptance speech demands 
a “reasonable increase in the regular 
army” and “that the first citizen reserve 
subject to call should be enlisted as a 
federal army and trained under federal 
authority.” 

Between this program and the Wilson 
program there is not sufficient certainty 
of choice so that anyone should cast a 
presidential vote for one or the other with 
“preparedness” as a decisive issue. Un¬ 
less one of the candidates takes a more cer¬ 
tain and radical position than either has 
taken to date “preparedness” talk from 


PREPAREDNESS 


29 


either camp should receive no considera¬ 
tion by the independent voter. It may be 
admitted that the administration has been 
culpably slow in preparing for our obvious 
need of increased military protection; but 
if the opposition has no definite program 
to present in the campaign, it may be as¬ 
sumed that it would likewise move very 
slowly when placed in power. 


AMERICANISM 


The issue of “Americanism” is likewise 
one largely made vital through Roosevelt’s 
thundering attacks on the “hyphenates.” 
But here again what bid fair to be an im¬ 
portant issue has lost much of its force in 
its handling by the two parties and candi¬ 
dates. Yet undoubtedly there are cer¬ 
tain prejudicial factors included under this 
title which may weigh heavily in the cam¬ 
paign, and the exact situation should be 
clearly understood in order that patriotic 
voters may not be “delivered” by profes¬ 
sional trouble makers against their true 
convictions. 

SYMPATHY WITH EUROPEAN POWERS 

Certain facts are indisputable. With 
all our official and private desire to be 
neutral in action, a clear majority of 
30 


AMERICANISM 


31 


Americans are pro-Ally in sympathy. 
This sympathy was partly the result of 
ancestry, language, tradition and private 
interest and partly the result of effective 
pro-Ally publicity at the start of the war. 
The German sympathizers, in minority 
numbers, resented this attitude and much 
of what they felt was unfair and manu¬ 
factured hostility to the Central powers. 

And, feeling at a disadvantage, the Ger¬ 
man sympathizers became quite aggres¬ 
sive in the assertion of their point of view. 
Then came general condemnation of the 
official German activities in fighting the 
English blockade and in attempting justi¬ 
fiably to influence favorable public opinion 
here and in attempting quite unjustifiably 
to hamper munition making here. Ap¬ 
proval of this official German aggressive¬ 
ness was mistakenly assumed to follow 
upon sympathy for Germany among 
Americans of German blood and certain 
professional German-Americans aided the 
popular misapprehension by championing 


32 


WHO WINS IN NOVEMBER? 


Germany’s offensive against us indiscrimi¬ 
nately with her offensive against the Al¬ 
lies. 


“hyphenates" 

Roosevelt’s attack on the “hyphenates” 
was primarily an attack on the latter small 
group—men who had so professionalized 
their championship of Germany that they 
failed to see or refused to see where they 
had become disloyal Americans. But in 
the vigor of his attack Roosevelt swept 
into a common enmity to him the small 
group of true “hyphenates” and the larger 
masses of Americans of German blood 
who were only German sympathizers and 
not in a shade of thinking disloyal to 
America. The latter were as outraged by 
the Lusitania and the attacks on munition 
plants as any American sympathizing with 
the Allies, but they bitterly resented the 
violence and breadth of the Rooseveltian 
condemnation. 


AMERICANISM 


33 


GERMAN-AMERICAN POLITICS 

As a result of this situation when the 
German-American Alliances swung the 
club of the German-American vote in the 
preconvention campaign they paradoxi¬ 
cally spoke for many voters who were 
thoroughly opposed to any attempt to 
“deliver” a racial vote and yet were so 
hostile to Roosevelt that they did not 
want to be forced to a choice be¬ 
tween him and Wilson. It is the firm 
conviction of the vast number of sym¬ 
pathizers with Germany that Wilson is 
personally wholly pro-Ally; that his “neu¬ 
trality” is a sham and his purposes anti- 
German. It is useless to discuss the bases 
for these ideas, as all the arguments are 
smothered in prejudices. And it is so ut¬ 
terly unpatriotic for an American to cast 
his ballot for President on the basis of a 
foreign sympathy or antipathy, that only 
the fact of this prejudice is mentioned. 
The truth or falsity of the idea ought to 



84 WHO WINS IN NOVEMBER? 

be wholly irrelevant to a consideration of 
issues of this campaign. 

HUGHES AND THE PRO-GERMANS 

The threat of German-American oppo¬ 
sition to Roosevelt played some part in the 
nomination of Hughes. How large a part 
no one can possibly tell, when so many fac¬ 
tors were under consideration by so many 
men. Certainly no such large part as the 
professional “hyphenates” would like to 
have believed. There can b§ no doubt that 
if Hughes were regarded as the German- 
American candidate he would be beaten 
overwhelmingly. There can be no doubt 
that he is not such a candidate. He has 
gone far in his stand for “undiluted 
Americanism” to repudiate the suggestion. 
He has denounced “covert policies” and 
“ the use of our soil for alien intrigues.” 
There is no possible toleration of a divided 
loyalty in his words, actions or record. He 
has plainly sought to avoid offending in 
mass those loyal Americans of German 


AMERICANISM 


35 


sympathy who felt themselves included in 
the great sweep of the Roosevelt rebukes. 
But if the “hyphenate” group insists upon 
working for Hughes’ election as a Ger¬ 
man-American triumph, the important is¬ 
sue will be raised of the success of a politi¬ 
cal group organized on anti-American 
lines. If this issue is raised Hughes will 
be forced to repudiate his supporters or 
accept a support which will insure defeat. 

“AMERICA FIRST"” 

Both candidates stand for a pure Amer¬ 
icanism ; America first and America alone 
holding the allegiance of its citizens. 
There ought to be no real issue here. Only 
utter mismanagement of the campaign can 
make one. There undoubtedly are many 
voters who will vote for Hughes to beat 
Wilson because they do not feel that Wil¬ 
son has been fair to the country that has 
their sympathy. And because of these 
votes there will also doubtless be many who 
will vote for Wilson to rebuke what they 


36 


WHO WINS IN NOVEMBER? 


feel is the disloyalty of those who vote 
against him on account of foreign sym¬ 
pathy. The independent intelligent voter 
who is truly patriotic, and wishes to serve 
his country with his vote will accept both 
candidates as exponents of pure Ameri¬ 
canism and vote for the one whose ad¬ 
ministration he believes will be best for 
the United States. The only American¬ 
ism issue in this campaign is not between 
the candidates but the voters—will they 
stifle all foreign sympathies and vote 
simply as Americans ? But if any consid¬ 
erable group campaigns on the basis of 
foreign sympathy they will reap the whirl¬ 
wind of an overwhelming opposition to 
the unfortunate candidate whom they 
ruin with their support. 


THE TARIFF 


The tariff has been for decades a great 
and vital issue between the republican 
party advocating import duties for the 
“protection of American industries” and 
the democratic party advocating “tariff 
for revenue only.” There will be much 
tariff talk in the present campaign, but 
honest analysis of the two party positions 
will show that underlying differences in 
program are no longer clear cut, and 
that by the test of probable perform¬ 
ances of the party in power, the tariff 
question is now a sectional rather than a 
national issue. The protective tariff of the 
republican party has always been largely 
a tariff in favor of New England. The 
democratic party with its main strength in 
the South is peculiarly forced to protect 
the industries valuable to the prosperity 
37 


38 WHO WINS IN NOVEMBER? 

of the “new South.” “Tariff for revenue 
only” has become a meaningless slogan. 
Both parties uphold the protective prin¬ 
ciple, the republicans avowedly, the demo¬ 
crats evasively. 

“log-rolling” 

Tariff making has always been a mat¬ 
ter of “log-rolling.” Representatives in 
Congress traded their votes for protection 
of the industries in other districts in ex¬ 
change for protection of their home in¬ 
dustries. 

In districts where there were great in¬ 
dustries profiting largely through a pro¬ 
tective tariff it was practically impossible 
for a congressman to be elected who was 
not pledged to “deliver” and able to “de¬ 
liver” the high tariff duties wanted by 
those industries. In plain language, suc¬ 
cessful tariff-making for each congress¬ 
man was a matter of exchanging his votes 
for schedules wanted by other congress¬ 
men for their constituents in exchange for 


THE TARIFF 


39 


votes for schedules wanted by his consti¬ 
tuents. 


TARIFF COMMISSION 

The results of such tariff-making were 
so bad for the whole country and so unfair 
to American consumers that there was a 
wide demand for a Tariff Commission to 
gather impartially and make available the 
statistics which should guide honest tariff 
making, which statistics are now produced 
largely by representatives of protected in¬ 
dustries—and hence partisan and unre¬ 
liable. There is no issue over this pro¬ 
posal, however, since between the “non¬ 
partisan commission” of the democrats 
and the “expert” commission of the repub¬ 
licans there is little choice. Possibly the 
democrats speak a bit more bravely and 
the republicans from past performance 
give better promise of living up to their 
weaker words. But it should be under¬ 
stood that neither party will do anything 
except continue a protective tariff and 


40 WHO WINS IN NOVEMBER? 

both parties will desire to raise as much 
revenue as possible to meet increasing ex¬ 
penditures. The real issue on the tariff 
is, that if the democrats fix the duties they 
will favor particularly those sections of 
the country where the democracy is strong, 
the South and certain industrial centers in 
the North; and if the republicans fix the 
duties they will favor particularly the sec¬ 
tions of their strength, notably New Eng¬ 
land and that part of the middle west east 
of the Mississippi. 

PARTY POLICIES 

These broad tendencies may be noted 
and fairly stated: (1) The democratic 
party will incline toward a low tariff and 
the republican party toward a high tariff. 
(2) The tariff will inevitably favor some¬ 
what the sections where the party in power 
is strongest and so be sectional by which¬ 
ever party it is made. It is however true 
that the democratic party is still distinctly 
the party of sectionalism and the republi- 


THE TARIFF 


41 


can, the party of nationalism. (See later 
discussion under “The Party Issue”). 
Therefore a democratic tariff may be rea¬ 
sonably expected to show more sectional 
favoritism than a republican tariff. 

Traditional thought will induce many to 
choose Hughes or Wilson, mainly on the 
tariff issue. A safer judgment for the in¬ 
dependent voter is to regard this as a local 
issue by which he may determine his vote 
for congressman and to select his presi¬ 
dent on more decisive national issues. 


WOMAN SUFFRAGE 


On the question of woman suffrage 
there is a real and plain issue between Wil¬ 
son and Hughes. Between the party plat¬ 
forms there is little choice. Between the 
leaders and between the rank and file of 
the parties there is a clear choice. 

In the first place, Wilson and Hughes 
have both arrived at a position favoring 
suffrage from original opposition. But it 
may be truly stated that Wilson has come 
reluctantly and Hughes has come gladly. 
As a result, Wilson clings to his party 
program and wants the question settled by 
the States while Hughes goes beyond his 
party program and flatly favors a consti¬ 
tutional amendment. Many argue that 
there is no real difference here because 
three-fourths of the States must approve 
a constitutional amendment before it be¬ 
comes a law. But the argument is falla- 
42 


WOMAN SUFFRAGE 43 

cious. Those desiring the speedy granting 
of woman suffrage know full well that the 
proposal of a constitutional amendment by 
congress and a campaign for ratification 
by three-fourths of the States is the way 
of least resistance to their goal. 

CANDIDATES ON SUFFRAGE 

Between the candidates, those who re¬ 
gard the suffrage issue as paramount will 
logically vote for Hughes—and those who 
regard it as important will weigh the issue 
heavily in his favor. 

PARTIES ON SUFFRAGE 

Between the parties, the suffrage issue 
also presents a fair choice. There are 
powerful anti-suffrage leaders in the re¬ 
publican party and strong pro-suffrage 
leaders in the democracy, but on the whole 
the republican party contains the largest 
numerical support for woman suffrage 
and the democratic party the largest num¬ 
erical opposition. 


44 


WHO WINS IN NOVEMBER? 


The states rights democrats oppose the 
speedy national amendment; large foreign 
groups of their voters represent traditional 
antagonism; large conservative groups, 
particularly in the South, believe in the 
ancient limitations of “woman’s sphere” 
and are not impressed with the rights of 
the independent woman worker, with 
which the East and North are more fa¬ 
miliar. 

The actual grant of woman suffrage has 
come largely in the republican states and 
women’s influence in that party is im¬ 
portant and effective. The progressive- 
republicans are another force in their party 
much more powerful than the progressive 
democrats in theirs. It is a simple fact that 
the republican party is an organization far 
more friendly to woman suffrage and far 
more likely to advance that cause than the 
democratic party. The issue here is plain 
and the only real question for the voter is: 
How much importance shall this issue be 
given in his final judgment? 


LABOR 


In considering the attitude of the candi¬ 
dates and parties toward the living and 
working conditions of the wage-earners 
we find contradictory facts and forces. 
Hughes may be said to represent the re¬ 
publican thought fairly well, although he 
has by no means adopted the full program 
of the advanced progressives. Wilson, on 
the other hand, is far ahead of his party 
rank and file on labor questions. It may 
be argued plausibly that the President’s 
activity in such matters as forcing through 
the child labor bill is based on policy rather 
than on a crusader zeal for legislation in 
the interest of working men and women. 
But achievement is more important than 
motive and the President can rightly claim 
the position of a friend of labor. Yet the 
democratic party, although containing the 
bulk of the manual workers, is so organ- 


46 


WHO WINS IN NOVEMBER? 


ized as to be far less responsive to their 
needs than the republican party. 

WHICH PARTY FAVORS LABOR 

Raymond Robins, former democrat and 
Chairman of the Progressive National 
Convention, determined to cast his future 
political fortunes with the republican party 
largely because he regarded it as the most 
efficient instrument to improve working 
conditions. He wrote: 

“The fixed Southern control of the 
Democratic Party is individualistic in its 
thinking, sectional in its sympathies and 
inherits a tradition against common labor 
as servile. * * * The Democratic 
primary voter mass control in the indus¬ 
trial cities is the most heterogeneous of our 
national groups and the excessive pressure 
of living and industrial conditions renders 
it the most fertile field for boss control in 
the service of selfish personal and corpor¬ 
ate interests.” 

Mr. Robins went on to show that the 


LABOR 


47 


most notable advances in progressive legis¬ 
lation (which term includes largely legis¬ 
lation for the improvement of living and 
working conditions) have been made in 
those states where the progressive element 
has been able to overthrow the conserva¬ 
tive control of the republican party and 
through that party carry the local govern¬ 
ment forward. It is true that much has 
been accomplished nationally under Wil¬ 
son but the careful observer will note that 
the democratic party has been driven for¬ 
ward and the republican party has been 
led forward. 

TO BE LED OR DRIVEN 

This difference is more important than 
it may seem at first glance. Not merely 
is an unwilling servant less efficient but the 
means necessary to force legislation from 
an unwilling legislator are harmful to the 
balance of the administration. The use of 
patronage and personal pressure on a con¬ 
gressman to obtain his vote means weak- 



48 WHO WINS IN NOVEMBER? 

ness in other departments of government 
with sometimes far reaching consequences. 
A “horrible example” is presented by our 
recent history. The appointment of Mr. 
Bryan as Secretary of State must have 
been made not only from considerations of 
political debt to him who made the Presi¬ 
dent’s nomination possible, but also be¬ 
cause the support of the Bryan men in 
Congress was absolutely essential to put 
through the President’s program of leg¬ 
islation. Wilson obtained the domestic 
legislation he demanded and the United 
States suffered immeasurably in conse¬ 
quence from the Bryan diplomacy during 
the greatest war in history when the serv¬ 
ices of a trained and competent Secretary 
of State would have been of untold value 
to the future of our country. 

If the party in power had been led to 
support progressive measures instead of 
driven, the President would have had be¬ 
hind the congressmen in their districts a 
demand for the legislation he desired, to 


LABOR 


which he could have appealed to coerce 
selfish or narrow-minded public officers, 
and it would not have been necessary to 
embarrass the public service in order to 
take care of “deserving democrats.” This 
is why the public opinion in the party is as 
important to consider as the opinion of 
the party leader. 

HUGHES AND WILSON 

It should not be thought that Hughes 
is not a “friend of labor.” But the argu¬ 
ment that the Wilson performances are 
to be weighed as heavier than the Hughes 
promises, while entitled to due considera¬ 
tion, should be measured with the argu¬ 
ment that the republican party has shown 
itself in performance to be more responsive 
to progressive demands for labor legisla¬ 
tion than the democratic party. 

THE DEMOCRATIC VOTERS 

At the same time it should be considered 
that the rank and file of the democratic 


50 


WHO WINS IN NOVEMBER? 


party contains a far larger number of 
those to be immediately benefited by la¬ 
bor legislation than the republican party. 
The believer in democracy may well argue 
that the workers themselves are those who 
will do the most for their own good and that 
those who wish them well should work with 
the party wherein they are most largely 
represented. The opposing argument is 
that the hard driven industrial worker, 
whose wage is close to the line of absolute 
necessity and to whom the least disaster, 
such as sickness or injury, threatens loss 
of food and clothing and shelter, has little 
time or ability to plan out the ultimate im¬ 
provement of his conditions. Furthermore 
a group of voters under such pressure is 
easily swayed by temporary self interest to 
vote for a generous candidate or helpful 
local boss against their own larger inter¬ 
ests. It is the history of most reform 
movements that support must come first 
from those in more secure and comfort¬ 
able circumstances, with education and 


LABOR 


51 


leisure sufficient to enable them to think 
and act upon the needs of tomorrow— 
those not wholly absorbed in the bread- 
winning problem of today. 

THE CHOICE 

To those interested in progressive labor 
legislation Wilson presents a record of 
performance and has definitely “taken that 
side.” Hughes presents fair promises and 
an open mind, expressing his philosophy in 
these words: 

“We shall not have any lasting 
prosperity unless we buttress our 
industrial endeavors by adequate 
•means for the protection of health; 
for the elimination of unnecessary 
perils to life and limb; for the safe¬ 
guarding of our future through 
proper laws for protection of women 
and children in industry; for increas¬ 
ing opportunities for education and 
training. * * * We make com¬ 

mon cause in this country not for a 
few but for all; and our watchword 
must be co-operation, not exploita¬ 
tion.” 


52 


WHO WINS IN NOVEMBER? 


Between the parties, the democratic 
party presents a record of recent credit¬ 
able performance under pressure; and of 
fundamental conservative control; the re¬ 
publican party has a creditable record of 
victories of its progressive element in the 
past; and of a fundamental progressive 
control. 


EFFICIENCY 


It is customary for the party out of 
power to charge the party in power with 
waste of public money and general inef¬ 
ficiency in government. It is doubtful 
whether such charges interest many except 
the partisans who are already convinced. 
The decision of Hughes to devote consid¬ 
erable time to that issue in this campaign 
can not be based on a desire to appeal to 
this ancient and rather ineffective preju¬ 
dice, but rather on two facts. First, the 
candidate himself is distinctly an efficient 
man, calm, practical and industrious, un¬ 
willing to substitute rough guesses for 
hard facts. Hence he is truly outraged at 
the general inefficiency of our national 
government, with its log-rolling appro¬ 
priations and lack of even an attempt at 
budget-making. Second, the recent ad¬ 
ministration has given some glaring ex- 


53 


54 WHO WINS IN NOVEMBER? 

amples of bad appointments and bad 
management. 

WASTE INEVITABLE 

The independent voter will, however, re¬ 
member too much inefficiency in the gov¬ 
ernment of the last five decades largely 
under republican control to feel that this 
is peculiarly a sin of the democratic party. 
Indeed a certain amount of waste and in¬ 
competence seems an essential part of 
popular government. The only pertinent 
questions in this campaign are: Has the 
Wilson administration been exceptionally 
inefficient? Is the democratic party 
naturally more inefficient than the repub¬ 
lican? 

Without going into a mass of statistics, 
which partisans will dispute, it may be 
justly stated that the administration has 
been confronted with a great many un¬ 
usual problems and that under the blun¬ 
dering guidance of various officials of per¬ 
haps slightly unusual incapacity some 


EFFICIENCY 


55 


notably poor governing has been done. 
Most of the chairmen of important con¬ 
gressional committees since 1912 arrived at 
those positions solely through seniority of 
service, being regularly re-elected from 
safe democratic districts in the South. 
Some of these men, who had attained great 
power through small abilities, were excep¬ 
tionally selfish and narrow-minded public 
servants. On the whole, balancing an en¬ 
ergetic and resourceful President against 
a mediocre cabinet, decayed congressional 
leaders, and greedy small fry officials de¬ 
manding patronage for a party hungry 
from long absence from power, it may 
be said that the Wilson administration has 
been below the average grade in general 
efficiency of government. 

THE PARTY AVERAGE 

In regard to a choice between parties, it 
may be assumed that usually efficiency and 
intelligence will be found in about equal 
quantities and that the more intelligent 


56 


WHO WINS IN NOVEMBER? 


districts will generally produce the more 
intelligent public officials. The republican 
party is strongest in those sections of the 
country representing the highest literacy, 
and it may be asserted without reflection 
on the individual democrat that the aver¬ 
age of republican efficiency in national 
politics is higher than the democratic 
average. 

This brief consideration of efficiency has 
been purposely general and philosophical. 
Campaign orators may produce statistics 
by the pound, but nothing will convince 
the average man that one party is more 
efficient than another, except a prejudice 
or an instinctive judgment based on pretty 
vague theoretical reasoning. After the 
voter has convinced himself in this man¬ 
ner statistics and argument will fall on 
deaf ears, so there is no effort to encumber 
this document with such wastebasket ma¬ 
terial. 


PROGRESSIVISM 

The issue considered under the heading 
of “progressivism” is not the attitude of 
candidates and parties toward progressive 
doctrines. The issue is rather the choice of 
those who wish to see progressive citizens 
unite on a political program to make pro¬ 
gressivism a dominant force in either the 
majority or minority party. Whether 
Wilson or Hughes appears to be the logi¬ 
cal leader of this group will be determined 
by a consideration of all the campaign 
issues and the candidates’ personalities. 
Whether the republican or democratic 
party offers the best machinery is discussed 
under “The Party Choice.” But in addi¬ 
tion there should be a brief survey of the 
reasons for the failure of the party dedi¬ 
cated to progressivism and the political 
lesson thereby taught. The story of the 
formation of the Progressive Party is 
well-known and a complete recital of its 
57 


58 


WHO WINS IN NOVEMBER? 


internal difficulties would fill a volume, but 
the last chapter of its existence may be 
written down as a useful explanation of 
why the party died and why a majority 
of its leaders have endorsed the republican 
candidate. 

PROGRESSIVE RESENTMENT 

Many ardent progressives have felt that 
their party was betrayed, and in their first 
resentment, were inclined toward voting 
for Wilson as a rebuke to those leaders 
whom they had trusted and who, they felt, 
had tried to “deliver” them to their ancient 
enemies. So many half-truths and down¬ 
right falsehoods have been circulated about 
the Progressive National Convention of 
1916 that a brief history of the events lead¬ 
ing up to the convention and of the con¬ 
vention itself may aid in the formation of 
accurate progressive judgment. The 
limitations of space and obligations of pri¬ 
vate confidence will prevent complete 
presentation of the evidence. But the fol- 


PROGRESSIVISM 


59 


lowing narrative is strictly reliable and 
based almost wholly on first-hand knowl¬ 
edge. 


THE DEFEATS OF 1914 

The beginning of the end of the Pro¬ 
gressive Party came in the elections of 
1914 —where a group of national candi¬ 
dates of ability, reputation, character and 
devotion to public service unsurpassed, 
were presented by the Progressives in dif¬ 
ferent sections of the country—and ran 
third! That answered the questions: Do 
the American people want a great third 
party? Has the Republican party ended 
its usefulness? The answer to both was, 
No. 

Progressive national leaders promptly 
conferred and divided on the issue: Shall 
we end our fight now and announce that 
we are through ? It was decided to go on 
through 1916, but in no spirit of hope for 
ultimate triumph. The decision was based 
purely on expediency—on the determina- 


60 WHO WINS IN NOVEMBER? 

tion that progressive principles could be 
best advanced by holding together the 
diminishing army of voters to be swung in 
a decisive hour to make one of the old 
parties the future political instrument of 
progressivism. 

THE ROOSEVELT STRENGTH 

The political strength of the progressive 
party was largely dependent on the politi¬ 
cal strength of Colonel Roosevelt. The 
moral force of the brilliant and high- 
minded group of leaders, the idealism of 
a large proportion of the rank and file 
were factors which opposing politicians 
could not overlook; but the immediate 
political power of the party lay in the per¬ 
sonal popularity of the “foremost private 
citizen in the world.” 

The year 1915 marked perhaps the low- 
tide record in Roosevelt’s political 
strength. His prestige had suffered 
greatly from the declining voting power 
of the progressives. He was hammering 


PROGRESSIVISM 


61 


away at unpopular doctrines—demanding 
preparedness and daily adding to the hos¬ 
tility of the “hyphenates” — without yet 
having convinced the country of its dan¬ 
gers from foreign attack and internal dis¬ 
loyalty. It was therefore with a keen 
realization of their losses in numbers and 
in the power of their chief that the pro¬ 
gressive leaders planned for the presi¬ 
dential campaign of 1916. There were a 
few persistently hoping for, or even believ¬ 
ing in, a revival of the party in the na¬ 
tional campaign and in the return of the 
old “Teddy” popularity. But the ma¬ 
jority (including certainly Colonel Roose¬ 
velt, who is not inclined to over-estimate 
his own strength) felt that the party had 
no future as an independent force, but 
must throw its power in aid of a more per¬ 
manent organization. 

THE PROGRAM ADOPTED 

A majority of progressives were former 
republicans as was their national leader, 


62 


WHO WINS IN NOVEMBER? 


and the natural course was so to utilize 
the progressive power as to compel the 
adoption of a progressive platform and 
naming of a progressive candidate by the 
republican party. The means adopted 
were so obvious that only their candor 
saved them from appearing ridiculous. 
The progressive convention was called for 
the same day and in the same city as the 
republican—Chicago, June 7. A state¬ 
ment announced the desire to unite the 
parties on platforms and candidates, if 
possible. As a paragrapher heartlessly 
described it, the progressive party adver¬ 
tised that it would be on a certain corner 
at a certain time, wearing a red carnation 
and that its intentions were matrimonial. 

PRE-CONVENTION SKIRMISHING 

From the date of the progressive an¬ 
nouncement in January until the conven¬ 
tions met, constant negotiations were in 
progress between responsible leaders in 
the republican and progressive parties. 


PROGRESSIVISM 


63 


In each party was a group of uncertain 
solidarity, which, with a united purpose, 
could probably sway the party decision. 
Let this be termed the “executive group.” 
The progressive executive group made 
one early mistake in judgment of far- 
reaching consequence. It underestimated 
the political strength which Colonel Roose¬ 
velt and his program would have in June 
—a strength which from January to June 
increased at a rate which astounded even 
the most optimistic. 

As a result of this error the progressive 
executive group swung the party power as 
a negative instead of as a positive force. 
It was argued that there was enough vital¬ 
ity in the party to defeat a non-acceptable 
republican running on a non-progressive 
platform. But it was not sincerely urged 
that Roosevelt as the progressive nominee 
might beat a reactionary republican so 
badly that even if he did not defeat Wil¬ 
son the campaign would finish the repub¬ 
lican party—because the executive group 


64 


WHO WINS IN NOVEMBER? 


did not believe this to be reasonably pos¬ 
sible. Yet by June it was plain that this 
position should have been taken by Pro¬ 
gressive leaders. 

THE SITUATION ON JUNE 7, 1916 

To sum up months of political skirmish¬ 
ing, this was the situation when the con¬ 
ventions met on June 7. The republican 
and progressive executive groups both 
were certain that Roosevelt would not run 
against Hughes, and that he might run 
against anybody else. The choice of the 
republicans for possible victory with a “re¬ 
united party” was Hughes or Roosevelt. 
Any other choice meant certain defeat. 
The progressive executive group wanted 
the progressive convention to wait and see 
what the republicans would do. In view 
of the extraordinary rise in the Roosevelt 
strength they thought there might be a 
chance to retrieve the earlier mistake and 
persuade the republicans to nominate 
Roosevelt—not by fear of his opposition 


PROGRESSIVISM 


65 


(that ace had been discarded) but by be¬ 
lief that he would be the strongest oppon¬ 
ent for Wilson. If this effort failed, it 
was the plan that the progressives should 
endorse Hughes after his nomination. 

THE CONCEALED PLAN 

This plan of the executive group was 
not fully revealed to the progressive dele¬ 
gates in order to avoid the opposition of 
the more radical progressives. The dis¬ 
heartening muddle of the end of the con¬ 
vention was the result of this policy of con¬ 
cealment which may be regarded as the 
second major error in the progressive 
strategy. There was a powerful senti¬ 
ment in the progressive convention in 
favor of nominating Roosevelt—not alone 
because of devotion to him, but in order to 
keep the party alive. (This latter point 
most of the diligent convention reporters 
missed.) This sentiment demanded a clear 
program: Nominate Roosevelt and go 
ahead if he will accept, whether the repub- 


66 WHO WINS IN NOVEMBER? 

licans nominate him or not. If he de¬ 
clines, nominate some one else and keep 
the party alive. 

The progressive executive group op¬ 
posed this policy for these reasons: First, 
they were sure that Roosevelt would de¬ 
cline if the republicans nominated Hughes; 
Second, the chances were then plainly ten 
to one that Hughes would be nominated 
(the opposition to Roosevelt being too 
firm and bitter to expect it to give way) ; 
Third, they were convinced that progres¬ 
sive party usefulness was ended and were 
committed to obtaining progressive sup¬ 
port of Hughes if he was nominated. 
They therefore wished to prevent the plac¬ 
ing of a third candidate in the field. 

THE PROGRESSIVE INTERNAL FIGHT 

Early in the convention a coalition of 
leaders, representing an overwhelming ma¬ 
jority vote, was formed to oppose the ex¬ 
ecutive group whose plans were unknown 
but whose ultimate intentions were cor- 


PROGRESSIVISM 


67 


rectly guessed. This coalition realized, 
however, that if Roosevelt were nominated 
prematurely and then rejected by the re¬ 
publicans they would be held responsible 
for the failure to unite the parties on him. 
On the other hand it was the firm intention 
of the great bulk of the delegates that 
they would not sit passive until Hughes 
was nominated and then endorse him and 
go home to face the charge of their out¬ 
raged friends that they had tried to deliver 
the party. These delegates led by the 
coalition leaders, were determined to “put 
it up to Roosevelt”—to nominate him and 
leave it to him to make the wisest decision 
possible. And this they accomplished. 
But in view of this policy there was much 
that was unfair in the outburst of resent¬ 
ment which the Roosevelt pronouncement 
brought forth. 

PUTTING IT UP TO ROOSEVELT 

It is true that the progressives exhibited 
a beautiful, but almost childlike, faith in 


68 WHO WINS IN NOVEMBER? 

the accomplishment of miracles by their 
great leader. Upon Hughes’ nomination 
and immediate acceptance there was abso¬ 
lutely nothing Colonel Roosevelt could do 
except endorse Hughes or lead a hopeless 
fight which would simply elect Wilson. A 
hopeless fight for principle could have 
been justified. But Roosevelt had long 
ago determined for his part that the de¬ 
feat of Wilson was the great necessity for 
the good of the country; his party leaders 
had committed themselves (impliedly 
with his sanction) to the support of 
Hughes. He would be forced to break 
faith with his belief in what was best for 
the nation and to all practical purposes 
with his own words—to make this hope¬ 
less campaign. Any other decision than 
Roosevelt’s declination of the progressive 
nomination was impossible from the mo¬ 
ment that Hughes accepted the republican 
nomination. 


PROGRESSIVISM 


69 


THE DEATH OF THE PROGRESSIVE PARTY 

In this brief story of the Progressive 
Convention, there can be found no reason 
why the progressives should vote for Wil¬ 
son or Hughes to preserve the party in¬ 
tegrity of progressivism. The election of 
neither will keep the progressive party 
alive as a political force, wholly conse¬ 
crated to the doctrines of progressivism. 
The election of Hughes will wipe out the 
last reason for the party’s existence, since 
he can only be elected by progressive votes 
and his triumph will mean that the pro¬ 
gressives are once more in the republican 
party in controlling numbers. 

The election of Wilson will not keep 
the progressive party alive. Plainly his 
election, with practically no progressive 
candidates in the field, will mean that the 
republican party will be the only existing 
minority party of effective size and the 
obvious machinery for all anti-administra¬ 
tion politics. 


70 WHO WINS IN NOVEMBER? 

The progressive party became desper¬ 
ately ill in 1914; perhaps miraculous doc¬ 
toring might have saved its life in 1916; 
but instead the responsible physicians de¬ 
cided on a major operation and the pa¬ 
tient died on the operating table. Groups 
may form calling themselves progressives 
—but they will be new organizations of in¬ 
dividuals, not even surviving remnants. 

For those who believe in progressivism 
the choice is not one of trying to keep the 
party dedicated to progressivism alive, but 
to determine which of the two old parties 
offers the best field for the political service 
of the progressive citizen. This question 
will be considered as “the party choice.” 


THE PARTY CHOICE 


For many the choice of the party with 
which to vote will be determined by habit. 
Former republicans after four years of in¬ 
dependence, or progressive alignment, will 
return to the “party of Lincoln.” Former 
democrats similarly will go back to the 
“party of Jefferson.” But there will be 
many who will seriously consider—partic¬ 
ularly in view of the necessity of primary 
voting—with which party they wish to 
work in the future. And many will per¬ 
mit a personal liking for Wilson or 
Hughes to determine this important ques¬ 
tion. 

The choice of a political party should 
be a serious one for all first voters and all 
progressives about to determine a new and 
probably lasting allegiance. The char¬ 
acter of the immediate party leader is an 
71 


72 


WHO WINS IN NOVEMBER? 


influential factor, but it has not the last¬ 
ing importance to the voter that the char¬ 
acter of the party has. 

RAYMOND ROBINS 5 CHOICE 

A most interesting political document 
is Raymond Robins’ statement to the pro¬ 
gressives explaining why he, a former 
democrat, has become a republican and 
answering the question: 

“In which of these dominant parties in 
the long run will progressive principles 
find most effective support, and where will 
the rank and file and leadership of the 
progressive party find largest co-opera¬ 
tion in the service of our common coun¬ 
try?” 

And the text of his answer is in these 
words: 

“Platforms change with each campaign 
and leaders come and go. Should we not 
consider that drift of opinion—almost gla¬ 
cial in slowness and certainty—whereby 
the permanent voting mass in each party 


THE PARTY CHOICE 73 

inevitably determines the topography of 
our political world ?” 

As an up-to-date presentation of the 
pro-republican answer to this question 
from a man of unbiased judgment and 
broad political experience the following 
extracts from the Robins statement of 
August 5, 1916, are offered: 

PROGRESSIVE VICTORIES 

“Let us now turn to the test of actual 
achievements in progressive legislation 
and administration. The freest and most 
progressive state in this union is Califor¬ 
nia. Eight years ago it was a rotten bor¬ 
ough and had been under shameless and 
corrupt corporation and boss control for 
a generation. Twenty years ago able and 
honest progressive democrats were fight¬ 
ing in that state for reform. They led 
in the education of the people but the rank 
and file of the democratic party refused to 
follow their leadership. How was the ac¬ 
tual deliverance of California achieved? 


74 


WHO WINS IN NOVEMBER? 


By the rank and file of the republican vot¬ 
ers under the leadership of Hiram W. 
Johnson. The second freest state in this 
union is Wisconsin. Twenty years ago 
the brewery ring of Milwaukee and the 
railroad ring of Madison controlled that 
state. Which party redeemed Wisconsin? 
The rank and file of the republican party 
under the leadership of Robert M. LaFol- 
lette. After long years of shameless cor¬ 
ruption and misgovernment Pennsylvania 
has made a notable advance toward decent 
government and progressive policies in the 
last two years. Here again the rank and 
file of the republican voters under the 
leadership of Governor Brumbaugh is 
breaking boss control of government in 
the Keystone State. When New Hamp¬ 
shire broke the bonds of her railroad ring 
how was that victory won? Through Rob¬ 
ert P. Bass and Winston Churchill sup¬ 
ported by the rank and file of the republi¬ 
can party. 


THE PARTY CHOICE 


75 


THE LESSON FROM ILLINOIS 

“My home State of Illinois is an illu¬ 
minating example of the general experi¬ 
ence. We have had able progressive dem¬ 
ocratic leadership and within the past dec¬ 
ade have won both the city and the state 
governments. Yet permanent gains for 
progressive principles have been practi¬ 
cally nil. A fatal incapacity for efficient 
administration or fundamental progressive 
legislation seems to rest upon the demo¬ 
cratic party in Illinois. After sixteen 
years, during twelve of which I served 
with the progressive democrats, the demo¬ 
cratic party is more completely under the 
control of a corporation boss who repre¬ 
sents the worst in our political system 
than at any other time in twenty years. 
The present administration at Washing¬ 
ton has helped rather than hindered the 
growth of this boss control of the demo¬ 
cratic party in Illinois. The progressive 
democrats of Illinois are a heartsick mi- 


76 


WHO WINS IN NOVEMBER? 


nority. The progressive republicans are 
a militant—and properly organized—will 
be a triumphant majority. The final re¬ 
generation of the government of this State 
will have to be won by the leadership of 
progressives in the republican party sup¬ 
ported by its rank and file. 

NATIONAL PROGRESS 

“When the hour came to break the con¬ 
trol of the corrupt plutocracy and the 
bosses over the national government, again 
it was the rank and file of the progressive 
republican voters that sustained the lead¬ 
ership in the White House and Congress 
which laid the foundation of effective pro¬ 
gressive opinion and finally culminated in 
the revolt of 1912. It was the fear of this 
progressive spirit that nominated Mr. 
Wilson over the choice of the democratic 
rank and file in the Baltimore convention; 
that maintained President Wilson’s con¬ 
trol over Congress; that dictated the pro¬ 
gressive planks in the democratic platform 


THE PARTY CHOICE 


77 


in St. Louis and nominated Mr. Hughes 
in the republican convention at Chicago. 
It was progressive republicans that fur¬ 
nished 95% of the leadership and 80% of 
the voters for the progressive candidates 
in 1912. 

THE STATES’ RIGHTS DOCTRINE 

“More and more it becomes plain that 
most of our pressing problems of large 
import are national in scope and will yield 
only to national action. Yet we find in 
the democratic party the modern, and let 
us hope the last, stronghold of the advo¬ 
cates of loyal sovereignty. This doctrine 
of individualism, sectionalism, and dis¬ 
union menaced and almost prevented the 
freeing of the colonies from foreign do¬ 
minion. This doctrine well nigh defeated 
the adoption of a unifying constitution 
wherein the American nation became a 
fact. This doctrine after sixty years al¬ 
most overthrew the national structure in 
dissension over the issue of slavery. This 


78 WHO WINS IN NOVEMBER? 

doctrine since the Civil War has delayed 
national legislation so urgently needed to 
solve the problems of pure food, transpor¬ 
tation, child labor and conservation. 
Wherever the fight for more efficient and 
more humane government has been waged 
this baneful doctrine of States Rights has 
been invoked to rally and shelter the anti¬ 
social forces, to arouse sectional bias, local 
jealousy and all mean, narrow passions 
that hold men’s eyes upon the ground 
when great human needs call upon them 
to look beyond the rough and dusty roads 
to the far country that is worth the toil 
and sacrifice of the long, hard journey. 

SECTIONALISM OR NATIONALISM? 

“Comprehending our national necessi¬ 
ties, how can a progressive hesitate long 
to choose between the party of nationalism 
and the party of sectionalism? Should not 
wise and sincere progressives go en masse 
into the republican primaries, and fight¬ 
ing shoulder to shoulder with progressive 


THE PARTY CHOICE 79 

republicans, help and be helped in our 
common struggle for social and industrial 
justice in city, state and nation? If this 
is generally done the common bonds of our 
fellowship for the past four years will not 
be broken but rather augmented, and we 
can continue to work together and bring 
back a chastened republican party to its 
ancient faith in human rights and national 
integrity, which made its triumph under 
Lincoln’s leadership the supreme achieve¬ 
ment of the democratic spirit in the his¬ 
tory of mankind.” 

THE DEMOCRATIC REPLY 

From the pro-democratic point of view 
it will be argued about as follows: 

1. The democratic party under Wil¬ 
son has put through a great program of 
national progressive legislation—from the 
Federal Reserve Act to the Anti-Child 
Labor Act. 

2. The democratic party is working 


80 WHO WINS IN NOVEMBER? 

away from sectionalism toward national¬ 
ism as shown by the Wilson legislation. 

3. The rank and file of the democracy 
are the workers—the group where radical¬ 
ism is natural—while the middle class rank 
and file of the republican party will be 
slow to approve of experiments in govern¬ 
ment that may threaten their comfortable 
condition in the established order. 

4. The great financial interests have 
always been powerful in the republican 
party and the protective tariff has been 
the “mother of privilege.” 

5. The progressive republicans were 
defeated in their party and forced to form 
a separate party to obtain freedom to be 
politically effective. Why should they 
return to the party which they rejected in 
1912? 


THE PRACTICAL ARGUMENT 

Beyond the theoretical argument is the 
practical one—there are more progressive 
republicans than progressive democrats. 


THE PARTY CHOICE 


81 


Therefore, if one would be politically 
effective, he is likely to go where he has 
the most friends rather than where he has 
the fewest. There is still another consid¬ 
eration. If progressive leadership were 
more powerful in one party than in the 
other, it might compensate for lack of 
numbers. But there is no democratic 
leadership compensating for republican 
numerical strength. A mental comparison 
of the names of the national leaders of 
progressive thought will show an over¬ 
whelming preponderance of republicans. 

THE NATURAL DRIFT 

On the party issue it is fairly certain 
that a large proportion of progressive- 
independents will incline to the repub¬ 
lican ticket. One question alone will turn 
this drift and that is a comparison be¬ 
tween Wilson and Hughes, wherein a de¬ 
sire to approve Wilson’s progressive legis¬ 
lation will be supported by an uncertainty 
as to just where Hughes stands. If it 


82 


WHO WINS IN NOVEMBER? 


becomes plain that Hughes is essentially 
progressive - minded and will militantly 
support a progressive program, the drift 
will be toward him. But uncertainty as 
to his attitude may turn a major number 
toward Wilson, despite their republican 
inclinations. 


MINOR” ISSUES 


The “minor” issues of this campaign in¬ 
clude some of the most important ever 
before the American people. They are 
only called “minor” because, between par¬ 
ties and candidates as the platforms and 
speeches define the issues, clear and 
marked differences in policy have failed 
to appear. 

FOREIGN POLICY 

The most notable example is on the 
question of international relations. Here 
by all logic there should be a great issue. 
We are in a time of unexampled compli¬ 
cations in foreign relations. We lack 
definite assurances of just what Wilson’s 
policies are after two years of controversy 
with foreign governments. In regard to 
Mexico, Hughes denies that there is any 
settled foreign policy, and argues that if 
83 


84 WHO WINS IN NOVEMBER? 

one were defined by Wilson it would not 
be adhered to for six months. But there 
is no alternative of republican policy pre¬ 
sented. Firm generalities and lofty state¬ 
ments of principle have been the mental 
food of the American people in the matter 
of international relations for two years 
and the offer of more of the same material, 
differently phrased, does not make a cam¬ 
paign issue. In fact—to carry the meta¬ 
phor a bit further—more of the same diet 
induces a slight, but noticeable, nausea. 

There is a certain unwillingness to dis¬ 
cuss candidly our foreign relations which 
may arise from the cosmopolitan charac¬ 
ter of the voting population. In these 
troublous days clear expressions of opin¬ 
ion on any international subject are almost 
certain to arouse the hostility of some of 
our “neutral” citizens, whose sympathy 
with one or another belligerent nation 
amounts to an almost fanatic support of 
all its acts, even when in conflict with 
American rights. 


“MINOR” ISSUES 85 

It appears likely that the campaign 
issue which should perhaps be the greatest 
(America’s foreign policy) will be the 
least clearly made. If this issue is really 
made it will dwarf all others, but at pres¬ 
ent it bids fair to remain to the end a 
“minor” issue. 

CONSERVATION AND MONOPOLY 

Conservation and monopoly are names 
that raise memories of great campaign 
battles. Nor are these issues dead. They 
are vital problems of the nation. But each 
national election turns on a few of the 
many crowding problems each adminis¬ 
tration must face and all others become 
for the moment of minor interest. The 
greatest problem of Wilson’s administra¬ 
tion has been our foreign policy, yet noth¬ 
ing received less attention in the campaign 
of 1912 in which Wilson was elected after 
a three-cornered battle of unusual ferocity 
over exclusively domestic policies. So it 
may follow that the election of 1916 will 


86 WHO WINS IN NOVEMBER? 

be swung on issues which will play little 
part in # the next administration. 

The effort of this writing has been to 
consider—not those issues necessarily of 
most real importance—but those which 
are likely to receive most attention dur¬ 
ing the campaign and upon which prob¬ 
ably a decisive number of independent 
voters will turn the election in favor of 
Wilson or Hughes. Other issues, there¬ 
fore, though of great importance to indi¬ 
vidual voters or to the future of America, 
must be for the present consideration 
classed as “minor” issues. 


WHO WINS? 


There is no intention to attempt proph¬ 
ecy in considering, upon the issues just 
presented, who will win in November. It 
is only intended here to summarize the 
logical drift of independent, progressive 
voters on these issues. It is not suggested 
that the voters will be logical. Probably 
a major number will decide on those 
temporary emotions which we dignify 
with the name of “instincts.” They will 
“feel friendly” to Hughes or Wilson or 
to the local politician who assists them 
with a bit of “influence” when they wish 
to indulge in our national habit of minor 
law-breaking. But a certain number of 
voters do wish to feel that they are logical 
in their balloting and for such it may be 
interesting to estimate how the majority 
of them might be expected to vote after 
87 


88 WHO WINS IN NOVEMBER? 

weighing candidates and parties against 
the dominant issues of the campaign. 


SUMMARY 

Mexico 

Wilson’s record is very weak, but on the 
whole about what a majority of the people 
have wanted. First, expressing moral 
wrath against Huerta; second, taking a 
high - sounding stand for international 
righteousness; and, third, avoiding any 
great trouble or expense by evading re- 
sponsibilty for the results of our “Mex¬ 
ican policy.” 

Hughes’ position is much stronger, 
more nationally selfish and with the critical 
power of hindsight; on the whole what 
will be regarded as statesmanship, and 
entitled to public approval, although not 
secretly as much approved as the Wilson¬ 
ian idea of “keeping out of trouble at 
almost any cost.” The balance on the 
Mexican issue will favor Wilson if there 


WHO WINS? 


89 


are no more embarrassing complications, 
and may swing toward Hughes if the 
Mexican question becomes acute and dis¬ 
tressing before November. 

Preparedness 

In default of a distinctive program from 
Hughes and popular education in its 
favor, Wilson will be favored on this 
issue—not because he should be, but be¬ 
cause of the failure of the other side to 
make a clear issue through a real opposi¬ 
tion program. 

Americanism 

This issue can only become acute 
through offensive activity in behalf of 
Hughes along lines of foreign blood and 
sympathy. A flat repudiation of such 
support by Hughes may take away this 
danger. If it remains the entire campaign 
may be swung in a rush of prejudice upon 
the lines of the European conflict. In this 
event Wilson will be elected. 


90 


WHO WINS IN NOVEMBER? 


Tariff 

The democratic tariff making with its 
stupidity and sectionalism plainly gives 
the balance on this issue to the repub¬ 
licans. 

Woman Suffrage 

Hughes’ declaration in favor of a con¬ 
stitutional amendment for suffrage gives 
him a marked advantage on this issue, 
which is increased by the traditional oppo¬ 
sition of a states’ rights democracy to any 
interference with state control of suffrage 
qualifications. The vote of the negro 
woman is no more desired in the South 
than the vote of the negro man. 

Labor 

Wilson’s record, combined with the pre¬ 
ponderance of democrats in the wage¬ 
earning groups, gives him a decided ad¬ 
vantage on this issue. Certain reactionary 
republican leaders increase this advantage 
for their opponents by their known and 


WHO WINS? 


91 


repeated hostility to organized labor. 
Hughes himself is entitled to better con¬ 
sideration by labor than he will probably 
get. 

Efficiency 

On this issue—not a very strong one— 
Hughes and the republican party will 
profit by comparison of the records of the 
candidates and parties. 

Progresstvism 

Hughes will receive a majority of the 
former progressive votes unless additional 
activity by Wilson in the nature of his 
Supreme bench appointments, the child 
labor bill and his actions in the matter of 
the railroad strike win over the independ¬ 
ents who are inclined to support Hughes 
but are waiting further demonstration of 
his progressiveness. 

The Party Choice 

On this issue a large majority of pro¬ 
gressive-independents will incline toward 


92 


WHO WINS IN NOVEMBER? 


the republican party. Only exceptional 
weakness in the Hughes campaign and 
some striking successes for the Wilson 
administration will change this plain and 
important drift back to republicanism. 


CONCLUSION 


There are too many uncertain factors in 
this campaign for any true non-partisan 
to make up his mind as to his presidential 
choice on all the issues two months before 
election. If one of a few of the above 
issues is decisive with the voter he might 
determine his balloting now, but on several 
his choice would inevitably wait upon the 
further sharpening of these issues in the 
oratorical battle when Wilson and Bryan, 
Hughes and Roosevelt, and other national 
leaders are all actively engaged in ham¬ 
mering home the campaign arguments 
from a hundred platforms. 

It is merely the attempt of this writing 
to condense and simplify the main issues 
in order that the interested citizen may 
listen through hours of campaign bunc- 
combe for those revealing minutes when 
the speakers state, or avoid stating, a posi- 
93 


94 


WHO WINS IN NOVEMBER? 


tion of real importance to the unbiased 
voter. In no sense are the issues com¬ 
pletely, or even adequately, considered. 
The effort has been simply to put up a few 
guideposts—not to present a map of the 
country, or to advise as to desirable roads. 
If the guideposts aid a few political wan¬ 
derers, who know where they want to go 
but are uncertain as to what roads lead in 
the desired direction, this writing will have 
served its purpose. 


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